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TORT LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY
The increasing importance of the problem of products liability is
depicted by the recent New Jersey case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.' In that case the plaintiff's husband had bought her a
Plymouth automobile as a gift. Ten days later she was driving on
a smooth, paved road at about twenty miles per hour when she heard
a noise from under the hood and the steering wheel spun in her
hands causing the car to veer sharply to the right and crash into a
wall. The plaintiff sued both the dealer and the manufacturer for the
injuries suffered in the accident. Thd complaint contained counts al-
leging both breach of warranty of merchantability and negligence, but
the negligence counts were dismissed because of a lack of evidence.
When the cause was submitted to the jury for a determination solely
on the issue of implied warranty of merchantability, a verdict was re-
turned in favor of Mrs. Henningsen for $3o,ooo against both the dealer
and the manufacturer. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed by the
New Jersey Supreme Court.
In a study of the action for breach of warranty by Professor Ames
it is shown that breach of warranty was, in its origin, a pure action
of tort.2 It continued as a tort action until Stuart v. Wilkins,3 in 1778,
which is said to have been the first instance of an action of assumpsit
upon a seller's warranty.4 From that time until the present the ten-
dency to treat breach of warranty as a contractual action has gained
momentum until now many courts simply assume that a warranty is
contractual in nature.5
Because the complaint in the instant case was for breach of war-
ranty the court was immediately faced with two problems. First, in a
contract action there must be privity between the plaintiff and the
defendant in respect to the matter sued upon.6 In the case at bar this
2Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (196o).
2Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. , 8 (1888).
33 Doug. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (1778). The earliest reported case upon a warranty
is said to have been in 1383. See Ames, note 2 supra at 8.
4See note 2 supra.
5Compagnia Italiana Transporto Olii Minerali v. Sun Oil Co., 43 F.2d 683,
685 (2d Cir. 1930); Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958);
Dunn v. Texas Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 84 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935);
Houston v. Lawhead, 116 W. Va. 652, 182 S.E. 780, 782 (1935).
6Young v. Aeroil Products Co., 248 F.2d 185, 19o (9th Cir. 1957) ; Page v. Cameron
Iron Works, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 283, 287 (S.D. Tex. 1957); Dennis v. Willys-Overland
Motors, Inc., iii F. Supp. 875 (W.D. Mo. 1953); Barni v. Kutner, 45 Del. 550, 76
A.2d 8oi (195o); Brown v. Howard, 285 S.W.2d 752, 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). For
a collection of cases see 77 C.JS. Sales § 305 (196o).
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privity was lacking. Secondly, a party is free to contract against a
warranty which would otherwise be implied.7 In the contract for the
sale of the car the manufacturer expressly disclaimed the type of lia-
bility it was sued for. As will be shown later in this comment, a return
to the old tort theory of breach of warranty would have eliminated
both of these problems as well as the unnecessary wrestling with the
contract theory.8
Since Mrs. Henningsen was not a party to the purchase of the
car, she is precluded from a recovery in a majority of jurisdictions
because of a lack of privity.9 In dispensing with the requirement of
privity the New Jersey court relied upon its former decision in Faber
v. Creswick,'0 where there was a lease containing a covenant that
the landlord would have the premises in good repair at the inception
of the occupancy. The wife of the tenant was injured because of dis-
repair of the premises in breach of that covenant. In a suit against
the landlord she obtained a recovery even though she was not a
party to the lease." The court in the Faber case cited as primary au-
thority for its decision section 357 of the Restatement of Torts, which
deals only with liability for negligence.' 2 In citing the Faber decision in
the instant case, the court noted that there the action was in tort while
the present suit was in contract. Thus the court relied on tort cri-
teria to determine that the plaintiff had standing to sue in contract.
The court attempted to justify this unusual intermingling of the two
theories by pointing out that historically actions on warranties were
in tort, sounding in deceit.'3 Thus it would appear that the court
held that actions on warranties are sufficiently tortious in nature to
justify using tort criteria to establish the extent of liability, but not
sufficiently tortious in nature to be decided solely on a tort basis.
The Uniform Sales Act says, "the implied condition [i.e., warranty]
that the goods are of merchantable quality applies to all goods bought
from a seller who deals in goods of that description, whether they
7See note 21 infra.
8In advocating the tort theory in preference to contract in this field, consideration
has not been given to such ramifications as the amount of damages and the statute
of limitations, but only to difficulties arising in regard to privity and disclaimer.
"See note 6 supra.
1031 N.J. 234, 156 A.2d 252 (1959).
rId. at 255.
'-Ibid.
s32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, oo (g6o). "Historically" in this context means
between 1383 and 1778. See notes 2 and 3 supra. Breach of warranty was originally
an action on the case for breach of an assumed duty, the wrong being in a form of
misrepresentation. See note 27 infra.
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are sold under a patent or trade name or otherwise."'14 It would seem
that this is just another way of saying that the manufacturer is under
a duty to anyone who buys his product to see that it is fit for the
purpose for which it is sold. Therefore the breach of this duty by
the manufacturer creates a tort. Under this view the courts would not
have to wrestle with privity, as did the court in the Henningsen case,
because privity would not be required.
The undesirable consequences to be derived from the continued ap-
plication of the contract theory to breach of warranty can be seen in
many cases. For example, a seller has been held to warrant meat to a
husband-buyer but not to a wife and son who consumed it and for
whom the meat was purchased. 15 It has been held that a child who
became ill after drinking deleterious pineapple juice had no cause of
action against the store where his mother purchased the juice be-
cause the implied warranty of fitness ran only to the purchaser and not
to the child.16 Another court has held that the wife of the purchaser
of a used automobile could not maintain an action against the
dealer for breach of warranty for defective brakes since there was
no privity of contract between the parties.'
7
As previously pointed out, the court in the instant case was faced
with the further problem that in the contract of sale the manu-
facturer expressly disclaimed all warranties, either express or implied,
other than certain warranties as to material and workmanship.' 8 It
is recognized by the Uniform Sales Act,' 9 and has long been held at
common law, 20 that the parties to a contract are free to make their own
agreement, and to dispense with a warranty that would otherwise
exist.
2 '
"'Bristol Tramways & Carriage Co. v. Fiat Motors, Ltd., [1910] 2 K.B. 831.
American authorities support this statement. Adams v. Peter Tramontin Motor
Sales, 42 N.J. Super. 313, 126 A.2d 358 (App. Div. 1956); Ryan v. Progressive
Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931). For a collection of cases supporting
this point see 126 A.2d at 363.
"Borucki v. MacKenzie Bros., 125 Conn. 92, 3 A.2d 224 (1938).
"'Stave v. Giant Food Arcade, 125 N.J.L. 512, 16 A.2d 460 (1940).
17Barni v. Kutner, 45 Del. 550, 76 A.2d 8oi (195o).
132 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69. 74 (196o).
"Uniform Sales Act § 77.
20J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. McClamrock, 152 N.G. 405, 67 S.E. 991 (191o);
Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Mahon, 13 N.D. 516, 1o N.V. 903 (1904).
"Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Lea, 198 F.2d 1012, 1014 (6th Cir. 1952); Lindberg v.
Coutches, 167 Cal. App. ad 828, 334 P.2d 701, 704 (Super. Ct. 1959); Von Zonneveld
Bros. & Philippo, Inc. v. Cary, 86 So. 2d 252, 254 (La. Ct. App. 1956); Kennedy v.
Cornhusker Hybrid Co., 146 Neb. 230, 19 N.V.2d 51 (t945); McDonald Credit
Serv., Inc. v. Church, 49 Wash.2d 400, 301 P.2d 1o82, 1083 (1956). For a collection
of cases supporting this point see 46 Am. Jur. Sales § 333 (1943).
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A disclaimer of warranty is contractual in nature. Where the con-
tract contains an agreement that no warranty other than that specified
in the contract shall be binding upon the seller, a warranty which the
law would otherwise imply is thereby excluded. 22 However, some
courts have recognized an exception to this rule and hold that war-
ranties cannot be disclaimed in certain instances, mainly on the ground
of public policy. In the principal case the court said "Chrysler's at-
tempted disclaimer of an implied warranty of merchantability and
of the obligations arising therefrom is so inimical to the public good
as to compel an adjudication of its invalidity." 23 This holding is
supported by ample authority in cases which are not dissimilar from
the instant case. 24 However, to reach such a result under the contract
theory, it is necessary to rely on public policy in order to controvert
established legal principles. This undesirable necessity would be
eliminated by reverting to the tort concept of products liability, for
there can be no disclaimer of liability under that theory.
With the present decision New Jersey has evaded problems of
both privity and disclaimer, either one of which in the past has usually
been sufficient to preclude a recovery in a case involving warranty.
It is submitted that this court had the opportunity to advance the
law more boldly in this field by relying on the tort theory of war-
rant). Instead the court compromised by eliminating contract require-
ments as to privity and disclaimer of warranty, while retaining the
concept that the defendant's basic liability arises from his breach of
contract.
The most desirable approach to this problem can be taken through
the logical extension of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., that warranty
is a matter of strict liability in tort.2. Under this view no contract
between the parties is necessary.26 The liability arises because the
seller, through his advertising and marketing and the insistence of
public policy, has assumed a duty to all members of the consuming
public and is responsible to those who may be injured by his neglect
of that duty.
Breach of warranty was originally a tort action on the case for
breach of an assumed duty, the wrong being a form of misrepre-
=Ibid.
'32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (196o).
2'Steamship Ansaldo San Giorgio I v. Rheinstrom Bros., 294 U.S. 494 (1935);
Olson Mfg. Co. v. Roberts, 131 Colo. 152, 28o P.2d 433 (1955); Eliott-Lewis Corp. v.
York-Shipley, Inc., 372 Pa. 346, 94 A.2d 47 (1935).
NMacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 282, 111 N.E. 1o5o (t16).
"'Jones v. Kelley, 20o8 Cal. 251, 28o P. 942 (1929); Rubino v. Utah Canning Co.,
123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
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sentation.27 There seems to be no logical reason to negative this
duty-indeed the very language of the present case implies a duty.
In referring to the New Jersy Uniform Sale of Goods Law the court
said:
"The transcendent value of the legislation, particularly with
respect to implied warranties, rests in the fact that obliga-
tions on the part of the seller were imposed by operation of
law, and did not depend for their existence upon the express
agreement of the parties."28
In Flessher v. Carstens Packing Co., 2 9 the Supreme Court of Wasl-
ington paved the way for a return to tort liability for breach of
warranty. This case was an action for injuries suffered when the
plaintiff ate diseased dried beef, prepared and sold by the defendant.
The court stated:
"[W]here there is a positive duty created by implication of
law independent of the contract, though arising out of a rela-
tion or state of facts created by the contract, an action on the
case as for a tort will lie for a violation or disregard of that
duty."
30
As in the principal case, there was an implied warranty, but the court
said:
"Whether the action be called one on warranty or of negli-
gence it comes to the same thing. It sounds in tort.... The
negligence consists in offering stuff not known to be wholesome
for sale, to the purchaser's injury."
3 1
In another Washington case,32 the plaintiff purchased from a re-
tail dealer an automobile manufactured by defendant and represented
to contain shatter-proof glass. A pebble from a passing truck struck the
windshield causing the glass to shatter and the plaintiff to lose an eye,
for which she brought this action. It was held that, "the rule in such
cases does not rest upon contractual obligations, but rather on the prin-
ciple that the original act of delivering an article is wrong.....a3
It is submitted that Washington has adopted the proper approach
to the problem of products liability. This approach has the advantage
of producing a just result without a strained extension of established
='Prosser, Warranty of Mercrantable Quality, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 117, 118 (1943).
832 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 77 (91o).
2993 Wash. 48, 16o P. 14 (1916).
'OId. at 15.
3id. at 17.
"Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 68 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
Id. at 412.
